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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether a written option, as extended, could be specifically

enforced, despite failure to pay the consideration therefor recited
therein, and following withdrawal of the option prior to the attempt
to exercise it.
2.

Whether parol evidence was admissible to show that the

consideration expressed in the written option was not intended to be
paid, rather that the subject matter of separate written purchase
agreements, complete in themselves, was intended to include consideration for the option.
3.

Whether the District Courts1 admission of fragmentary, unin-

telligible documents for the purpose of determining the credibility of
a central witness was reversible error.
4.

Whether the admission, and application to the central ques-

tion of the value of optioned land, of an appraisal shown to have been
based upon a substantial error as to zoning, was reversible error.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for specific performance of an extension of an
option to buy land, as assigned.

The District Court ordered specific

performance.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In Fall, 1981, a period of high inflation and falling land values, William Colman approached appellants John Archer and Elliott
Wolfe seeking a loan of money with which to finance Colmanfs mineral
project at Carson Sinks, Nevada.

Archer and Wolfe refused, because of

1

adverse tax consequences, to make a loan.

Findings Nos. 4, 5; Tria

transcript Volume III, p. 417, Vol. V, pp. 731-732, Vol. IV, pp. 53
537.

After discussion and review of reports indicating the great

potential value of the project, however, Archer and Wolfe agreed to
purchase a limited partnership interest in the project for
$250,000.00, upon condition that the purchase be structured to prov
certain tax advantages and an over-riding royalty on the project.
Vol. Ill, p. 419 et seq., Vol. V, p. 731 et seq., Vol. I, p. 10 et
seq., Vol. IV, p. 537.
As Colman needed a larger sum of money, he offered also to sel
Archer and Wolfe a property known as the Anderson Ranch in Cache
County, Utah.
539.

Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 423-425, Vol. V, p. 734, Vol. IV, j

After discussion and investigation of values and opportunities

to sell, Colman agreed to sell and Archer and Wolfe agreed to buy tl
ranch for $250,000.00.

Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 424-425, 428, Vol. V, pp.

734-740, Vol. IV, p. 239 et seq.

It was agreed that the purchasers

would be the Archer and Wolfe family trusts.

See Exhibit 4, Agreerm

for Purchase of Real Property.
Colman thereafter sought an option to re-purchase the ranch aft
one year.

Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 430 et seq., Vol. I, pp. 739, 746, Vol.

IV, p. 541.

Appellants agreed upon condition that the option be dat

some time ('March 1, 1982) after the ranch purchase closing (January
1982), to avoid any impression that the transaction was intended as
loan (which would have resulted in ordinary income treatment, rathei
than capital gains treatment of any proceeds of any sale).

Tr. Vol.

V, pp. 764-765.
Written documents for these transactions were then prepared:

a

Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership, purchasing an inte

2

est in the Carson Sink project for $250,000.00, an Agreement for Purchase of Real Property, to purchase the ranch for $250,000.00, and a
one-year Option.

See Exhibits 3, 4, Tr. Vol. I, II, pp. 137, 152.

Archer, Wolfe, and Colman testify that these documents were separately
prepared and executed at different times, as the dates affixed to them
show.

Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 437, 439, 441, 455, 459, Vol IV, pp. 547, 549,

555 et seq., Vol. V, pp. 749, 751, 753, et seq.
disputed by the attorney who drafted the papers.

This testimony is
Tr. Vol. I, pp. 65-66.

Sometime thereafter, Colman sought an extension of the option
period to 18 months.

Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 563, 564, Vol III, p. 449, et

seq., Vol. V, p. 760, et seq.

Appellants agreed to provide the exten-

Appellants and Colman assert that appellants1 price for holding

sion.

the property at Colman1s disposal another 6 months was $5,000.00, and
the extended option was made to recite that it was given in consideration of "$5000 and other good and valuable consideration."

Tr. Vol.

Ill, p. 449 et seq., Vol IV, p. 563, et seq., Vol. V, p. 760 et seq.
Copies of the pertinent documents - the Certificate and Agreement
of Limited Partnership, the Agreement for Purchase of Real Property,
and the 18 month Option - are attached hereto as Appendix 1.
The Option was drawn for the signatures of all of the trustees of
the Archer and Wolfe trusts:

John Archer, Elizabeth Archer, Elliott

Wolfe, Hubert Wolfe, and Judy Wolfe.

Only the signatures of John and

Elizabeth Archer and Elliott Wolfe were ever affixed.

See Exhibit 8.

A copy of the partially executed Option was given to Colman upon
delivery of deeds to the ranch, January 4, 1982.
p. 458.

Tr. Vol. Ill,

Colman did not then pay the $5,000.00 for the Option (Tr.

Vol. Ill, p. 465, Vol. IV, p. 571), or attempt to record the Option,
Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 402-403.

3

Beginning in March, 1982, appellants made repeated demands on
Colman for the $5000.00, but he never paid it because he didn't the
have the money.
V., pp. 768-770.

Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 467-474, Vol. IV, pp. 574-589, V
Finally, appellants advised Colman that the optio

would be regarded as invalid if the $5000.00 was not paid.

Tr. Vol

IV, p. 589.
When appellants subsequently received notice that Colman had
assigned the option to respondent, appellants notified respondent t
the option had not been paid for.

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 311, 312.

Appe

lants agreed to sell the land to respondent for the $650,000.00 pri
plus the $5000.00 option price.
declined.

At first, respondent agreed, but t

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 319, 321.

Appellants then notified re-

spondent in writing that the consideration for the option had never
been paid, and that the option, to the extent it was not void, was
withdrawn.

Tr. Vol. II, p. 322, Exhibit 50.

This action for specific performance of the option followed.
Prior to admission of any of the relevant documents, without
making a determination that the documents in issue were in any sens
ambiguous or subject to explanation, and without any claim that fra
or mistake was in any sense involved, the District Court, over appe
lants1 repeated objections, admitted all evidence proffered regardi
the preliminary discussions surrounding preparation of the document
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 51-52, 58-61, Vol. Ill, p. 463, Vol. IV, pp. 524525), for the purpose of determining the "real" nature of the trans
tions.

Generally, this evidence consisted of the testimony of the

lawyer who prepared the documents, who testified that he took no pa
in the negotiation of the documents (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 43, 93-95), di
not know whether he had ever received any instructions about the

4

documents from appellants (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 44-45, 49, 63), and had
never had communication with any party regarding the $5,000.00 figure
recited in the Option (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 154-155), but that he regarded
the transactions between Colman and appellants as a loan.

Eventually,

the District Court determined that the transactions between appellants
and Colman were "the functional equivalent of a loan" of $500,000.00,
at 20% simple interest, for 18 months, secured by the Anderson Ranch,
in which the consideration for granting the option was the sale of the
limited partnership interest and the ranch.

Findings Nos. 21, 30.

Therefore, the District Court ruled, the $5000 recited in the option
was an empty phrase, and need never have been paid.

Id.

The District

Court granted specific performance of the option.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Decision of this case required construction of documents clear
and unambiguous on their face:

an agreement to purchase a limited

partnership interest for a fixed price; an agreement to purchase land
for a fixed price; a one-year option to re-purchase the land for a
fixed price, subsequently extended to 18 months upon consideration of
$5000.00.

It was never claimed, and the District Court never found,

that the documents were in any sense ambiguous, or their meaning
unclear.
The purpose of the form of the documents, dictated by appellants,
was admittedly specific tax benefits expected to follow thereform; the
transactions admittedly would not have been entered into by appellants
except in such form.
Based upon the testimony of the attorney for seller in the transactions that, though he had participated in none of the negotiations

5

for the transactions and had never discussed the consideration for
option with any party, he regarded the transactions as constituting
loan secured by the realty, in which the $5,000.00 recited in the
option was not intended to be paid, and even though that theory COL
not account for the conveyance of the valuable limited partnership
interest, the District Court found:

(1) that the transactions cons

tuted a secured loan; (2) that the consideration for the option was
the sale of the limited partnership interest, the sale of the land,
and the price to be paid for the land; and (3) that the $5000.00
recited in the option was never intended to be paid.
The District Court's ruling violated the parole evidence rule
that it varied the plain terms of the documents.
The admission of parole was not justified by an inquiry into t
consideration for the option, because it varied the contractual con
siderations stated in the limited partnership and land sale agreements, altered the subject matter of these agreements, and eradicat
the legal effect of the agreements, namely, the tax structure for
which they had been entered into.
The admission of parol in variance of the terms of the documen
was not justified by the rule allowing a showing that apparently
separate documents are integrated, since that rule does not permit
variance of the terms of the documents.
4

The admission of parol was not justified by an attempt to show

that the absolute conveyance of the land was intended as a mortgage
security.

The evidence in that regard was not clear and convincing

and did not purport to show that appellants regarded the transactio
as anything but a sale and option.
The judgment was also reversible because based unon evidence

6

inadmissible upon other grounds, namely, unintelligible fragments of
handwritten notes upon which the District Court based its view of the
credibility of a central witness, and an appraisal of the value of the
subject land shown to have been based on a fundamental error regarding
the zoning of the land.

ARGUMENT
I.

The option attempted to be exercised was not supported by consideration, and had been withdrawn.
A.

An option, not supported by separate consideration agreed

upon by the parties, is merely an offer subject to withdrawal by the
optioner at any time before acceptance creates a contract.
An option is not a contract.
(Utah, 1975).

Catmull v. Johnson, 541 P.2d 793

It is in the nature of a continuing offer.

Unless

something of value is given to keep the offer open for a particular
time, it may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance.

Fitzgerald

v. Boyle, 193 Pac. 1109 (Utah, 1920).
The consideration for an option, like the consideration for any
other contractual benefit, in what the parties agree shall be exchanged for it.
The District Court found that the consideration for the option in
this case was the sale of the ranch and the limited partnership interest.

Finding No. 21.—

There are two fundamental errors in this find-

ing:

The finding throws in for good measure the price to be paid for
the land. The consideration for an option, however, must be
apart from the consideration to be paid for the land. See C.C.
Slaughter Cattle Co. v. Potter County, 235 SW 295 (Tex. Cir. App.
1921), aff'd 254 SW 775 (1923).
7

1.

It is unsupported by any admissible evidence (see the

discussion of parol evidence infra).
2.

It accounts, at most, for a one year option.

**•

The extension of an option, if it shall not be subject tc

withdrawal at any time before acceptance, must be supported by
separate, additional consideration.
The extension of an option is a separate offer.

It may be wit

drawn at any time before acceptance, unless a separate and addition
consideration is given for it.

Coleman v. Applegarth, 11 A. 284 {K

1887); Franck v. Seavey Mfg. Co. , 153 N.E. 209 (Ohio, 1926); Gambi.1
v. Snow, 189 S.W. 2d 33 (Tex. App. 1945); Cummins v. Beavers, 48 S.
891 (Va. 1904); Ide y^_ Leiser, 24 P.695 (Mont. 1890).

The law in t

regard is not different from the law regarding new consideration fo
any addition to an existing agreement.

E.g., Liberty Mut. Fire Ins

Co. v. Hubbard, 551 P.2d 288 (Ore. 1976); Rossellini v. Banchero, 5
P.2d 955 (Wash. 1974); PLC Landscape Construction v. Picadilly Fish
Chips, 502 P.2d 562 (Utah, 1972).
The agreement to sell the limited partnership interest and the
agreement to sell the ranch were admittedly reached before the one
year option was requested and agreed upon.
IV, p. 554, Vol. V, p. 746.

Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 430, V

Documents constituting the limited par

nership purchase, the ranch purchase, and the one year option were
produced and approved.

Tr. Vol. I, II, pp. 137, 152.

There is no

dispute that an agreement for a one year option existed following t
agreements for purchase of the land and the limited partnership.
Vol. I, II, pp. 137, 152-153, Vol. IV, pp. 554.

T.

If the ranch and

limited partnership sales were consideration for an option, it was one year option.
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Some months later, because his expectations of permanent financing on his project had been delayed, Colman sought an extension of the
option to 18 months.

Tr. Vol. I, p. 137, Vol. IV, pp. 563-564.

Appellants say they demanded $5,000.00 to hold the property at Colman's disposal a further 6 months, and that the $5,000.00 was never
paid.

Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 449 et seq., Vol. IV, p. 563, et seq., Vol. I,

p. 760 et seq.
nothing:

Respondent says that appellants demanded and accepted

the consideration for the \\

year option was the same as the

consideration for the one year option first agreed upon.

Tr. Vol. I,

pp. 151-154.
Regardless of which claim the Court accepts, the result is the
same:

no separate or additional consideration was given for the six

month extension of the option.
attempt to exercise it.

The one year option ran before any

The only attempt to exercise came on the last

day of the 18 month option, two months after the offer had been
withdrawn.

II.

Parol evidence was inadmissible to vary the terms of the written
documents.
A.

A written agreement, apparently complete and certain, will

be conclusively presumed to contain the whole agreement of the parties
on the subject matter.

B.T. Moran, Inc. vs. First Security Corp.,

28 U. 316, 24 P.2d 384 (1933).
The pertinent documents in this case, the Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership, Agreement for Purchase of Real Property,
and Option, are complete on their face, straightforward and clear.
There is no ambiguity in them which invites interpretation via parol.
Indeed, the District Court in this case never determined that the

documents were anything but complete and clear, or even entertained
question to that effect.

Parol evidence should not be admitted unl

the court first finds that the documents are in some sense ambiguou
Winegar v. Smith Inv. Co., 590 P.2d 348 (Utah, 1979); Big Butte
Ranch, Inc. v^ Holm, 570 P.2d 690 (Utah, 1977).
**•

Where the documents are complete and clear, evidence that

the parties intended by them any effect except what appears from th
face is inadmissible.

Foxfilm Corp. v. Ogden Theatre Co., 82 d. 27

17 P.2d 294 (1932); Last Chance Ranch v. Erickson, 82 d. 475, 25 P.
952 (1933).

The parol evidence rule as codified in Utah (§78-25-16

Utah Code Ann. (1953) (Supp. 1983)) is as follows:
§78-25-16. Parol evidence of contents of writings - When
admissible.
There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, ot
than the writing itself, except in the following cases:
(1) When the original has been lost or destroyed, in whi
case proof of the loss or destruction must first be made.
(2) When the original is in the possession of the party
against whom the evidence is offered and he fails to produce i
after reasonable notice.
(3) When the original is a record or other document in t
custody of a public officer.
(4) When the original has been recorded, and the record
a certificied copy thereof is made evidence by this code or ot
statute.
(5) When the original consists of numerous accounts or
other documents which cannot be examined in court without grea
loss of time, and the evidence sought from them is only the
general result of the whole.
Provided, however, if any business, institution, member o
profession or calling, or any department or agency of governme
in the regular course of business or activity has kept or reco
ed any memorandum, writing, entry, print, representation or coi
bination thereof, of any act, transaction, occurence or event,
and in the regular course of business has caused any or all of
same to be recorded, copied or reproduced by any photograph^* ~ ,
photostatic, microfilm, micro-card, miniature photographic, or
other process which accurately reproduces or forms a durable
medium for so reproducing the original, the original may be
destroyed in the regular course of business unless its preserv,
tion is required by law; and such reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in evidence as the origina
itself in any judicial or administrative proceeding whether th<
original is in existence or not, an enlargement or facsimile o
such reproduction is likewise admissible in evidence if the
10

original reproduction is in existence and available for inspection under direction of court. The introduction of a reproduced
record, enlargement or facsimile, does not preclude admission of
the original.
In the cases mentioned in subdivisions (3) and (4), a copy
of the original, or of the record, must be produced; in those
mentioned in subdivisions (1) and (2), either a copy or oral
evidence of the contents.
No one asserts that any of the statutory exceptions to the rule are
applicable in this case.
The Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership in this case
provides simply that for $250,000.00, to be paid at the times set out,
the limited partners will receive specific royalties on production
from specific properties, together with a commitment to spend the
money on specific categories of costs.

The document is a simple

equation in which specific considerations are exchanged.

The subject

matter of the purchase and sale, as well as the price, are set out
unequivocally.
The same is true of the Agreement for the Purchase of Real Property:

under it a specific property will pass upon payment of a

particular price.
The Option is equally simple and clear; it is a straightforward
promise to hold the land available for sale at a price in return for
payment of a specific sum of money.
The judgment in this case plainly varies the terms of the written
documents.

It cancels the consideration recited in the Option.

ings Nos. 20, 21.

Find-

To provide consideration for the option, it draws

from the subject matter of the Certificate and Agreement of Limited
Partnership and Agreement for the Purchase of Real Property, by altering the exchanges recited there.
pertinent documents.

It alters the dates of all the

It eradicates the tax structure which all parti-

cipants in the transactions testified was the essential basis upon
11

2
which the investments were made.

Findings Nos. 30, 31.—

The trans

tions involved cease to be carefully structured sales of a limited
partnership interest and land, with a separately justifiable option
and become "the functional equivalent of a secured loan."

Unless s

exception can be found for it, the judgment in this case violates t
parol evidence rule and must be reversed.

The District Court's ruling contains remarks which suggest tha
the District Court believed that tax structures, notwithstandi
they may be very valuable and may have been openly bargained f
and agreed upon, are somehow unreal, or insubstantial, or even
improper, and can't be the "real" basis for enforceable transa
tions. See Findings Nos. 7, 8.
The uncontradicted testimony of all witnesses to the tran
actions in this case (Archer, Wolfe, Colman, Allen) is that
appellants insisted upon the structure set forth in the pertin
documents for tax purposes, and refused to consumate the trans
tions as the "loan" found by the District Court, and that apel
lants had the entirely superior bargaining position: the tran,
actions could not have been done except upon appellants1 terms
Tr. Vol. I, pp. 45, 95-96, 111, Vol. II, pp. 381-386, 419, 435
Vol. IV, pp. 537-542, 570, Vol. I, pp. 731-732, 740-744, Vol.
pp. 9-12. The documents were drawn in the form in which they
appear because appellants insisted upon it, and Colman conceed<
Allen admitted that the transactions were not a loan. Tr. Vol
I, p. 111.
Respondents1 tax expert testified that the tax structure i
very valuable, that he could find nothing improper in it, and
that he would not have done the transactions differently. Tr.
Vol. Ill, pp. 371-386, Exhibit 11.
The fact that the transactions in this case may have had •
same effect for Colman as obtaining $500,000.00 for lh years a20% simple interest on security of the Anderson Ranch - at leai
if one wholly ignores the substantial value of the limited par1
nership interest also conveyed - does not permit the court to
ignore the specific structure written into the transactions, ii
violation of the parol evidence rule, on the ground that the
structure was intended to obtain mere tax advantages.
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III.

No exception to the parol evidence rule exists for the District
Court's ruling.
A.

Generally, recitals in a written instrument as to considera-

tion are not conclusive, and it is competent to inquire into the
consideration and show by parol evidence what the true consideration
was,

Neilsen v^ MFT Leasing, 656 P.2d 454 (Utah, 1982); Wood v.

Roberts, 586 P.2d 405 (Utah, 1978).
This rule is applicable, however, only provided that
(1)

such evidence does not destroy the legal effect of the

instrument, or
(2)

vary its terms, and

(3)

the recital is not contractual in nature.

Id., Paccagnini

v. Bort, 190 N.E. 2d 493 (111. Apps. 1963); Paloni v. Beebe, 110 P.2d
563 (Utah, 1941).
The District Court in this case found that the consideration for
the Option was not the "$5000.00 and other good and valuable consideration" recited in it, but the subject matters of the Certificate and
Agreement of Limited Partnership and the Agreement for the Purchase of
Real Property, namely, the sale of the limited partnership interest
and the sale of the ranch.

The basis for this conclusion was the

testimony of Frank Allen regarding supposed remarks of the parties in
the process of preparing the documents, an "affidavit" of Colman
prepared by Allen after the fact, and certain fragments of "notes"
written by Colman of conversations with unidentified persons after the
fact.

All of this evidence was, of course, parol.
If the basis claimed for this resort to parol is an examination

into the consideration for the Option, it was inadequate, because the
District Court's ruling requires, as well, the alteration of the sub-
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ject matters of the limited partnership and land purchase agreemeni
the variation of the plainly contractual provisions regarding cons;
eration in these agreements, and destruction of the legal effect oj
all three documents.
i.

The District Court's reconstruction alters the subject
matter of the limited partnership and land purchase
agreements.

In the District Courtfs reconstruction of the transactions between Colman and appellants, the subject matter of the Certificate
Agreement of Limited Partnership ceases to be the exchange of a lin
ed partnership interest for payments of money.

The money under the

agreement, according to the District Court, passes as a loan, upon
(implied?) promise to repay or convey the Anderson Ranch.

The limi

partnership interest, therefore, passess without consideration, or
3
upon some unexpressed consideration.— The effect of this intrepret
tion of the document obviously alters the subject matter entirely.

Possibly/ the District Court regarded the limited partnership
interest as insubstantial. Possibly, the District Court belie
that a real transfer of a valuable interest was not intended,
fact, the undisputed testimony was that the royalties obtained
the limited partners were worth a very substantial amount of
money (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 47, 117 et seq., Vol. IV, pp. 527-528,
637-638), potentially much more than the Anderson Ranch. Resp
dent's witness Allen testified that the royalties alone justif
the sum paid for the limited partnership interest (Tr. Vol. I,
pp. 119, 121-122), and that the value of the limited partnersh
interests simply couldn!t be accounted for on the theory that
transactions constituted a secured loan. Indeed, so great was
the potential value of the royalties that Allen tried very har
to dissuade Colman from transferring them (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 118
et seq.). The latter testimony demonstrates that Allen certai
believed that the Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partner
ship entitled Archer and Wolfe to transfer of the royalites; a
there is no question that the document has that effect on its
face. It is true, as the District Court noted, that, at the t
of trial, four years after execution of the agreement, no assi
ment of the royalties to appellants had occurred. The Distric
14

The subject of the Agreement to Purchase Real Estate, under the
District Court's ruling, is not a promise to convey the Anderson
Ranch, but an implied promise to repay the $250,000.00 required
thereunder.

Again, the subject matter of the agreement has been

altered.
It is not permissible, under the guise of proving by parol the
consideration of a written contract, to add to or take from the other
provisions of an instrument, to modify or impair the operative effect
thereof, to defeat the agreement, or wipe out its essential terms, or
to change its subject matter.

E.g., Tarr v. Hicks, 393 P.2d 557

(Colo., 1964); Kane v. Union State Bank, 384 S.W. 2d 358 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964): Johnson v. Johnson, 178 S.W. 3d 983 (Ky. 1944); 30 Am.
Jur. 2d Evidence, §1056.
ii.

The consideration expressed in the limited partnership and land purchase agreements are contractual, and
may not be varied by parol.

By the Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership, appellants Archer and Wolfe promised to make certain payments over time and
Owanah Oil Company promised to convey certain interests in the Carson
Sink project, including royalties, and to expend the sums received on
certain categories of costs.

By the Agreement to Purchase Real Es-

tate, the Archer and Wolfe trusts promised to pay a sum of money, and
Royalty Investment Company promised to convey a property.
Whatever argument might be made that the consideration recited in

Court failed to note, however, that no assignment was due for
three years under the terms of the document, that the litigation
had occupied the period after the assignment was first due, and
that the assignment had been demanded by appellants but not
received. Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 519.
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the Option is not contractual, the consideration stated in the limi
partnership and land purchase agreements are obviously contractual,
and it is not competent to attempt to vary them by parol.

See Palo

v. Beebe, supra; Wood v. Roberts, supra, Paccagnini v. Bort, supra.
It is not permissible to attempt to show that the consideration for
the limited partnership interests was not the money expressed in th
agreement, and vice versa.

It is not permissible to attempt to sho

that the consideration for the land was not the money, and vice ver
That is to say, it was not permissible to attempt to show that any
considerations expressed in these agreements was the consideration
any further transaction, namely, the option.
The same result is reached by applying the straightforward ru]
that where the consideration to be given has been agreed upon, it
cannot be added to by parol.

Rice, Melby Enterprises, Inc., v. Sal

Lake County, 646 P.2d 696 (Utah 1982).

The consideration agreed tc

paid for the limited partnership interest and the land was a total
$500,000.00, not $500,000.00 plus a 1^ year option on the land.
iii. The District Court f s reconstruction destroys the
legal effect of all the pertinent documents.
All witnesses in this matter testified that the transactions i
structured in the particular manner shown by the face of the docurm
to accomplish particular tax objections of the investors, and that
transactions would not have been entered into otherwise.

Tr. Vol.

pp. 45, 95-96, 111, Vol. Ill, pp. 381-386, 419, 435, Vol. IV, pp.
542, 570, Vol. V, 731-732, 740-744, and see Vol. I, pp. 9-12.

If

limited partnership transaction was a genuine purchase of royaltie
and related limited partnership rights, with a genuine promise to
expend sums invested on qualified costs, the investment was entitl
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to a "research and development" credit against the investors1 taxes.
If the ranch purchase was a genuine purchase, with a subsequent genuine option supported by real and separate consideration, proceeds of
the subsequent sale of the property would be entitled to capital gains
treatment.

If, on the other hand, the transaction was, as the Dis-

trict Court found, a secured loan of $500,000.00, no research and
development credit is available, and any "repayment" of funds is subject to ordinary income treatment.

See the testimony of respondent's

witness William T. Crosby, Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 371-386, Exhibit 11.
That is, not only does the District Court's reconstruction of the
documents alter their legal effect on their face - from purchase to
loan - it eradicates the legal effects - the tax effects - except for
which it is admitted the transactions would never have been entered
into.
B.

Parol evidence is admissible to rebut the presumption that

separate documents complete on their face are individually integrated.
Bulfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 U.2d 261, 501 P.2d 266 (1972).
Parol evidence may be admitted to show that apparently separate
documents are interdependent.

That is, parol is admissible on the

question of the intent of the parties that the documents be construed
together.

Id.

Respondents1 claim in this case that the transactions

between appellants and Colman were "integrated" may be intended to
invoke this rule.
Nothing in this rule, however, suggests that once the documents
to be integrated together are identified, parol is admissible to vary
their unambiguous terms.

Bullfrog Marina holds that once documents to

be integrated together are identified, breach of the provisions of one
may be considered breach of the over-all agreement; it does not hold
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that as a result of the integration, the unambiguous terms of both
agreements may be transformed into something which appears in neitl
agreement.

Bullfrog Marina does not create a rule that the terms c

an unambiguous integration are variable by parole (whether one doci
ment or many are involved).

See Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. , v. Nju

sen, 672 P.2d 746, 750 (Utah, 1983).
In the present case, whether the subject transactions - the Sc
of a limited partnership interest, the sale of the ranch, and the
option on the ranch - are considered separately or together creates
ambiguity in their provisions as to consideration, or any other mai
ter.

Taken together, they do not cease to be sales of assets with

option and become a secured loan.
(testimony of Frank Allen).

See Transcript, Vol. I, p. Ill

Parole was not admissible to vary the:

terms as to consideration to show that, in order to obtain the lim:
partnership interest and the ranch, appellants had to give not onl]
the $500,000.00 ($250,000.00 for the limited partnership and
$250,000.00 for the ranch) recited in the relevant documents, but <
year option on the ranch as well, or that, to obtain the option,
Colman need not have paid the $5000.00 recited in it.

Bushnell Rec

Estate, supra; Rice, Melby Enterprises, Inc. vs. Salt Lake County,
supra.
None of this is altered by the District Court's finding that 1
sale of the Anderson Ranch for $250,000.00 and the granting of an
option to buy it back in lh years for $650,000.00, "cannot stand
alone."

Finding No. 30.

This finding is effectively one that the

District Court did not understand the wisdom of the land sale and
option as "integrated."

As the District Court expressed it in the

Memorandum Decision:
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"The Court finds it was the desire of the defendants to
effectuate a series of transactions such that they could purchase
the Anderson Ranch for $250,000.00; on a latter date grant an
option to the seller to repurchase for $650,000.00; on different
date to advance $250,000.00 to a limited partnership in exchange
for a share of the partnership profits for a three year period
and a permanent project at Carson Sinks to be documented by an
assignment from the general partner to Archer and Wolfe. Accordingly different dates were with the approval of Colman so
used...
"To give literal effect to such position one would have to
conclude that the value in 1981 of the Anderson Ranch was little
more than $250,000.00 with an expectation that it would increase
in value over the ensuing one and one-half years and that the
optionee would also regard it as having a 1981 value of
$250,000.00 and a later value of $650,000.00."
Since an option is an offer to sell, not an agreement, or even an
offer, to buy, it has none of the implications suggested by the District Court.

In an uncertain market, the price to buy stated in an

option represents only the worst case price optionee may have to pay
to force a sale.

If the market remains down, optionee is hardly

prevented from bargaining for a lower price.

The price stated in the

option does not necessarily represent what the optionee believes the
land will be worth at the end of the option period.

It represents

nothing as far as the optionee is concerned except a sum in excess of
the potential value of the land.
In any case, the fact that the court may think a transaction
clear on its face and openly arrived at unwise or inequitable does not
create such an ambiguity as allows resort to parol to remake the
agreement in a form more satisfactory to the court.
C.

The evidence was inadequate to show that a loan was

intended.
The District Court's finding that the transactions between appellants and Colman constituted a secured loan contains the gratuitous
remark that such finding is not crucial to the decision.
31.

Finding No.

Presumably, this intends to insulate the ruling, because the
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finding is improper.

In fact, since the heart of the ruling is the

sale of the limited partnership interest and the ranch were conside
tion for the option, it is obvious that this finding is essential t
the ruling.
The District Court accepted Frank Allen's claim that the "reaJ
purposes of the transactions were not appellants' tax purposes, but
Colman's financing purposes.

If the tax purposes are credited, the

limited partnership interests can be consideration only for the
$250,000.00 recited in the pertinent document, and the ranch can be
consideration only for the $250,000.00 recited in that document.

I

is only upon the "loan" theory, which regards the tax structure as
sham, that consideration can be separated from the limited partners
and land sales to apply to the option.
It is true that parol may be admitted to show that a conveyanc
absolute on its face is in fact a secured loan.

The evidentiary

requirements for such a showing, however, are very high.

Faced wit

these requirements, respondent's counsel in post trial memoranda di
avowed any attempt to make the necessary showing.
to Defendants' Post Trial Memorandum, p. 2.

Plaintiff's Repl

In fact, however, such

showing is crucial to the ruling.
i.

I_n order to show that a conveyance absolute on its face
should be construed as a mortgage or security instrument,
the evidence must be clear, unequivocal, and convincing.

An absolute conveyance will be presumed to be what it purports
its face to be, unless the evidence that it was intended as a secur
instrument or mortgage is "clear, unequivocal, and satisfactory", o
"clear, satisfactory, and convincing".
942, 947 (Utah, 1933).

Corey v. Roberts, 25 P.2d 9

See also Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, 13 P.2
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636 (Utah, 1932); Kjar v. Brimley, 27 U.2d 411, P.2d 23 (1972).
The evidence in support of the District Court's ruling in this
case was essentially the testimony of Frank Allen.

Whether it was

clear, unequivocal and convincing is discussed below.
i^-

The evidence must show that both grantor and grantee understood that the conveyance was made as security for a debt
and not as an absolute conveyance.

It does not suffice to show that one party to an absolute conveyance thought, or wished, it a mortgage instead.
clear and inequivocal that both so perceived it.

The evidence must be
Corey v. Roberts,

supra., 25 P.2d at 942; and see Clark v. George, 234 P.2d 844 (Utah,
1951); Christensen v. Christensen, 339 P.2d 101 (Utah, 1959).
It is perhaps on this point that respondentsf evidence failed
most resoundingly.
this:

Frank Allenfs testimony comes to little more than

that his client, Colman, wanted to obtain a loan of at least

$500,000.00 secured by the Anderson Ranch (Tr. Vol. I, p. 42, 104,
112); that appellants refused to make such a loan (Tr. Vol. I, p. 43,
pp. 109-111); that appellants1 bargaining position was so dominant as
to allow them to dictate terms (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 95-96); that Allen was
not privy to any of the negotiations attempting to compromise these
positions (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 43, 93-95); that eventually he learned that,
for tax reasons of appellants which he did not understand (Tr. Vol. I,
p. 47), appellants and Colman had agreed that appellants would invest
$250,000 in a carefully structured limited partnership interest in
Colmanfs mineral project, and purchase the ranch for $250,000.00 (Tr.
Vol. I, pp. 4 3-45, 49); that later Colman asked for and was given an
option to purchase the ranch for up to one year later for $600,000.00
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 59); that he was instructed to prepare documents to
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these effects, but that he does not know whether any of these instr
tions came from appellants or only from Colman (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 4449, 63); that after he had prepared the documents, Colman sought an
extended option, for 1% years at $650,000.00, and that appellants
agreed (Tr. Vol. I, p. 137); that he does not recall anything additional charged for the extension of the option (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 152
156); that he had no way of knowing the actual value of the Anderso
Ranch (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 124-125); that the transactions, taken together, appeared to him to have the effect, from Colmanfs standpoin
of a loan of $500,000.00, at 20% simple interest, secured by the
Anderson Ranch - at least so long as he ignored the very substantia
value of the royalties part of the limited partnership interest, wh
simply did not fit into this scheme (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 159-160); and
that he made no effort to understand the purposes or effects of the
transactions from the standpoint of appellants (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 9495).

Allen had no communication of any kind with any party to the

transactions regarding the $5,000.00 price recited in the option (T
Vol. II, pp. 154-155).

He concluded that, from the standpoint of h

client, Colman, which was all that mattered to him, the "total tran
action" was a "loan" of $500,000.00 at 20% simple interest, secured
the Anderson Ranch, and that the royalties must have been "added
incentives" (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 159-160); though, in fact, no one eve
told him any of these things.
Frank Allenfs testimony does not even purport to establish app
lants1 purposes in the pertinent documents, beyond commenting that
appellants refused to make a loan, and had tax purposes which Allen
did not understand.

All Allen knew, or cared about, was that, igno

ing the limited partnership interest, the transactions taken togeth
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had the effect, for Colman, of obtaining $500,000 with the prospect of
regaining the Anderson Ranch upon payment of $650,000.00 at the end of
18 months.

He was unable to recite a single comment by any appellant

tending to indicate that the tax purposes for which they insisted upon
the particular transactions were not real and serious, or were in any
sense illegitimate.

Indeed, the views derived by Allen from his

limited perspective do not even prove that Colman regarded the transactions as a loan.
Certainly, the view of an advocate for one side of a transaction,
from a limited perspective that does not include negotiation of any of
the transaction or recollection of any direct comment about the purpose of the transaction by any party on the other side, that the
purpose of the transaction corresponds to his clients1 original purpose, despite having been cast in an entirely different form upon
refusal of the other side to accede to his client's original purpose,
is not "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence" of the fact.

The

District Court's ruling is not insulated from this defect by the
gratuitous remark written into the conclusions by respondents1 counsel
and signed by the court that, though a mere preponderance was the
appropriate standard, the evidence was clear and convincing.

There is

nothing in the record to indicate that the District Court, in making
its ruling/ was even advertent of the appropriate standard, or made
any effort to see that the evidence measured up.
iii. _In attempting to show that an absolute conveyance was intended as a mortgage or security instrument, the most important fact to show is that the parties knew that the amount
paid for the property was substantially less than its actual
value at the time.

Kjar v. Brimley, supra; Rizo v. McBeth,
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398 P.2d 209 (Aka., 1965).

See also Corey v^ Roberts,

supra.
It was of central importance to respondent's case to show tha
the Anderson Ranch was worth $500,000.00 in Fall 1981 and was so
perceived by appellants, so as to form the security for a $500,000
"loan".

The testimony indicated the contrary - that Archer, Wolfe

and Colman believed the Anderson Ranch had a cash value of $250,00(
in Fall, 1981, the price then paid for it.

Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 424-^

429, Vol. IV, pp. 639-640, Vol. II, pp. 734-737.
To counter this evidence, respondent offered an appraisal of 1
value of the property as $427,240.00 in 1972, prepared by one
Marcellus Palmer (Exhibit 58, Tr, Vol, IV, p. 646 et seq.).

Appel-

lants objected on the ground the bases for the opinion shown in the
document wer° ^^t oron^rly reve?led (Tr. Vcl. IV, p. 647 et seq.)*
Upon examination, it appeared that Palmer had included in the apprc
al, and had not valued separately, assets other than the land, and
that the highest and best use for which the value was stated was be
upon an assumption that the property was zoned permissively for de\
opment when, in fact, the property was zoned restrictively against
development (Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 709-714).

The actual restrictive zor

of the property was shown by the local zoning map.

Exhibit 80, Tr.

Vol. VII, pp. 1172-1174.
Appellants objected to the admission of the appraisal on the
ground it was shown to have been made on an incorrect basis.

The

District Court took admission of the appraisal under advisement, bu
subsequently made it the basis of a finding that the property was
worth at least $500,000.00 in 1981, as it had been professionally
appraised as worth $427,240.00 in 1972.
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Finding No. 30.

This finding was plain error.

The appraisal, if it was admis-

sible, was no basis for finding the property to have been worth
$427,240.00 in 1972, thus worth $500,000.00 in 1981, because it assumed a greater developability of the property than was proven to have
been true.

The indication of the appraisal was that the land was

necessarily worth far less than $427,240.00 in 1972.

This evidence,

combined with the uncontradicted testimony, showed that the property
could not have been worth $500,000.00 in 1981, and could not have been
regarded by the parties as security for a $500,000.00 loan.
While the findings of the District Court are entitled to respect,
they may be reversed where clearly in error (Elton v. Utah State
Retirement Board, 28 U.2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 (Utah, 1972); First Security Bank, N.A. v^_ Hall, 29 U.2d 24 504 P.2d 995 (Utah 1972)), and this
should be done where the finding is essential to the overall ruling.
iv#

Parol is admissible only to show the intent of the parties,
not to vary the terms of the documents.

Thomas v.

Ogden State Bank, supra, 13 P.2d at 639.
Even if it could be shown that the deeds and Option in this case were
intended as a mortgage rather than an absolute conveyance, that would
not have authorized the District Court to strike the $5000.00 consideration term from the option, or to replace it with part of the
consideration for the limited partnership and land sales agreements.

III. Colman's "notes" were inadmissible, and their admission was reversible error.
Respondent's Exhibits 54, 55, and 56 were poor photocopies of
incomplete, unintelligible fragments of "notes" in Colman's handwriting.

No explanation of the condition of the documents was proffered
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except respondent's counsel's handling of them.—
No date for the documents was ever shown.

The circumstances

under which they were prepared were never established.

Colman coul

only identify them as possibly fragments of notes of conversations
with respondent's counsel.

Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 945 et seq.

reading of the documents was ever established.

No cohere

Id.

The District Court took under advisement appellants1 objectior
5
to admission of these documents—. Tr. Vol. VI, p. 978. No decisic
was ever rendered on the objection, but the documents were subseque
ly admitted, and formed a basis for the District Court's disbelief
the crucial testimony of William Colman.
Objections to

Findings

and Conclusions,

Transcript of Hearing on

July

30,

1986, pp.

Rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides as follows:

52-53.
"When

Counsel removed the originals from Colmanfs office, and delivc
them to a secretary to copy. No record was made of the origii
condition of the documents; no check was made to assure that 1
copies accurately represented the originals; and the original;
thereafter disappeared. Counsel could not show that portions
the originals had not been lost or left uncopied, or that the
documents had not been stapled back together in a form differ*
from the original. Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 1107-1120, 1144-1161.
Among the objections was that the documents were required to 1
produced by the pretrial order, and had not been. While the
pretrial order was not written, the District Court's understai
ing of it was the same as appellants' counsels. Tr. Vol. IV,
695. Respondents' assertion that the documents need not have
been produced as they were rebuttal was obviously incorrect:
documents were used on cross-examination.
Like other crucial evidentiary rulings, the admissibilit;
the notes was taken under advisement, then the notes were adm
ted sub rosa and relied upon without any cogent ruling on adm
sibility being made. The same treatment was accorded the par
san testimony of respondents' counsel (Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 392
seq.) which underlies the court's finding on substantial comp
ance with the terms of the option regarding exercise (Finding
Nos. 54-56), and the "affidavits" of Colman and Allen (Exhibi
27 and 28) as positive evidence of the facts recited therein.
See Tr. Vol. I, p. 89; Findings Nos. 32 and 33.
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writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party,
an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part
or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously with it."
The purpose of this rule, which is identical to the federal rule,
is to prevent false or misleading impressions which spring from incomplete texts.

See McCormick, McCormick on Evidence, §56, 3rd ed.

(1984).
Where the complete text necessary to an intelligible reading of
the documents, which is in turn necessary to an appropriate determination of the identity of the persons speaking therein and the circumstances under which the documents were made, is not available, the
documents should not be admitted.
dence.

See Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evi-

In such circumstances, the documents cannot give a clear or

helpful impression.

Application of such a rule is particularly apt

when the facts known about custody of the documents indicate the
possibility that the condition of the documents may be due to mishandling by counsel who proffers them, or, worse, to partisan editing.
Where fragmentary documents are improperly admitted, and though
it cannot be determined what meaning the court drew from them, it is
clear that they have materially affected the Courtfs view of the
credibility of a central witness, the error in admission is reversible
in and of itself.—

The District Court's findings treat the decision in this case as
a contest of credibility between Frank Allen and William Colman
(Compare Findings Nos. 32 and 33), and the "notes", Exhibits
54, 55, and 56, and Colman1s reaction to them are specifically
found to denigrate Colman1s credibility. See Finding No. 33. In
fact, the record reveals that Colmanfs angry reaction to the
"notes" was based upon the supposition that respondent's counsel
may have obtained them improperly from counsel respondent had
27

IV.

Appellants were entitled to interest on the sums deposited wi1
the Clerk of the District Court.
The District Court in this case awarded to respondent interesl

the sums deposited with the Clerk as payment for the subject prope]
despite the admitted fact that respondent has had the use and posse
sion of the premises at all relevant times.

Respondent maintains c

trailer house on the property, and he and his family use it througl
the year for various recreational purposes.
275, 280, 287-291, 295, 297.

Tr., Vol. II, pp. 223,

The property is fenced, with locked

gates, and posted against trespassing.

Respondent maintains the

fences, and controls the keys to the gates.

.Id. , Vol. II, p. 782.

The basis for the District Court's ruling was the fact that ir
one year, when respondent used a small portion of the property, together with leased public lands, for running cattle, he paid appellants part of the profits of this operation.
294.

Tr., Vol. II, pp. 291

The following year, when respondent did not propose to run

cattle, appellants, after inquiring with respondent, leased the sar
part of the land for this purpose to another.
Vol. IV, p. 521.
the land.

Tr., Vol. II, p. 28'

Otherwise, appellants have neither occupied or us

Tr., Vol. II, pp. 782.

That is, appellants have receive

portion of the proceeds of leases for running cattle on a portion c
the land in two years, while respondent has received a portion of s
proceeds, and has otherwise had exclusive use and possession of the

retained to represent Colman. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 685 et seq.
Unintelligible, unidentifiable fragments, are no more useable
cross-examination than for establishing facts. Witnesses are
entitled to review the documents used to cross-examine them
pieces of the document, rendered unintelligible, possibly by
partisan editing.
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land throughout.

The value of the ranch for running cattle is a tiny

fraction of the over-all value of the property.

Tr., Vol. II, p. 295,

Vol. VII, pp. 1216-1217.
It appears that respondent may have delayed repairs to certain
present improvements on the land pending the outcome of the litigation, but the delay was voluntary, and did not diminish respondent's
on-going occupation and use of the lands.

Tr., Vol. II, pp. 290-291.

Utah has adopted the majority position regarding entitlement to
interest on the purchase price where the purchaser seeks specific
performance and an award of lost rents and profits:
The guiding principle with respect to the calculation
of the damages incident to the decree of specific performance . . . is to relate the performance back to the date set
in the contract. Timely performance of the contract would
result in the purchaser receiving the rents and profits of
the land but being denied the use of the purchase money, and
a purchaser who seeks to recover rents and profits must
permit an offset for his use of the purchase funds during
the period that performance was delayed. In an early case
this court held that a defendant in a situation like the one
before us should be permitted to offset against the profits
interest on the entire purchase price. (Heinlen v. Martin,
(1979) 53 Cal. 321, 232.) This holding is the overwhelming
weight of authority. [Citations ommitted.]
Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427, 430-431 (Utah, 1980) quoting Ellis v.
Michelis, 32 Cal. Rptr. 415, 60 Cal. 2d 206, 384 P.2d 7 (1963).
In the present case, respondent does not seek lost rents and
profits, presumably because respondent has had possession and use of
the land throughout, and no use of the land has been made by appellants without respondent's consent.

In that circumstance, in the

event respondent were to prevail, there is no reason why appellants
should not be entitled to interest on the deposited funds, with an
adjustment for lease payments previously received.
Otherwise, the Utah rule is the straightforward one stated in
Pack v. Hull Development Co,, Inc., 667 P.2d 39 (Utah, 1983):
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"The

award of interest in a case such as this depends on who has posses,
of the property.

If the seller has in some way prohibited the buy*

from taking possession, no interest is allowed on the unpaid balan<
If, however, the buyer has possession, interest will generally be
awarded."

667 P.2d 40, citing Blomquist v. Bingham, 652 P.2d 900

(Utah, 1982); Amoss v^ Bennion, 23 Utah 2d 40, 456 P.2d 172 (1969)
Farnsworth v. Jensen, 117 Utah 494, 217 P.2d 571 (1950).

It is ad]

ted that respondent had possession and unfettered use of the prope:
at all times.

He did on it all he would have done had his ownersh.

been undisputed.

Appellants did nothing with the property except

lease a portion of it with respondent's consent.
In the circumstances, it was merely vindictive not to award
intdicoc co app^j-i.c*xics, witn an appropriate credit for Liic minor si
received by them from a cattle lease.

CONCLUSIONS
The documents in issue in this case are clear and unambiguous
this is true whether the Court reads them together or apart.

The

testimony about them is uniform that they were entered into in the
form in which they appear for specific tax purposes of appellants.
They would not have been entered into in any other form.

There is

evidence that appellants1 tax purposes were insubstantial or in an;
manner improper: even respondents1 evidence is to the contrary.
The District Court has entirely discounted and refused to give
effect to appellants1 purposes in the documents, without explanati<
or rationale for doing so.

To reach its judgment, the District Coi

has cancelled the consideration stated in the subject Option, and
substituted therefore the consideration bargained and paid for in 1
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Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership and Agreement for
Purchase of Real Property.

The judgment alters the subject matter of

the documents, changes contractual considerations, and destroys the
legal effects - the tax structure - which all witnesses testify was
the basis of the transactions.
was submitted except parol.

No evidentiary basis for the ruling

Admission of this evidence violated the

parol evidence rule.
Even the most nearly applicable exception to the parol evidence
rule - that for showing that an absolute conveyance was intended as a
mortgage - permits only a showing of the intent of the parties, not
variation of the terms of the documents, and requires clear and convincing proof that both sides of the transaction regarded it as a
security transaction.
Respondents1 evidence, Frank Allen's testimony, even had it been
admissible, proceeds from a limited viewpoint and limited opportunity
to observe, and includes nothing which tends to indicate that appellants1 purposes were other than appear from the face of the documents.
It was not clear and convincing evidence in support of the District
Court's ruling.

Other crucial elements of proof in respondent's case

- the evidence of contemporaneous value of the Anderson Ranch, and the
evidence upon which the District Court chose to disbelieve William
Colman - were inadmissible, or failed to provide a clear and convincing basis for the judgment.
The present is precisely the sort of case for which the parol
evidence rule was made.

It prevents claims by either side of a trans-

action that the benefits to either side exceed what the documents
provide; or that more can be had for less consideration than is
stated.

The evidence here is that any consideration agreed upon for
subject option was never paid, and that the option was withdrawn
before being exercised.

It could not be specifically enforced.

The judgment in this case is without evidentiary basis, and
should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted this ^
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CERTIFICATE AND AGREEMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
OF SOLAR CHEMICAL COMPANY

THIS CERTIFICATE AND AGREEMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP is
effective as of October 15/ 1981, and is executed pursuant
to the laws of the State of Utan, Title 48, Chapter 2, Utah
Ccce Annotated, 1953, as amended, and certifies as follows:
1,

Nane of Partnership.

The name of the Partnership

hereoy formed is SOLAR CHEMICAL COMPANY whicn snail herein be
called "the Partnership".
2,
m

Character of the Business.

The character o-f tne business

which the Partnership is to engage is the development of

technology for extracting sodium and saline minerals from brine
and salt deposits and to proceed with the extraction, production
and .Targeting of sodium and sodium salts (the "minerals") located
on or under tne land located in Churchill County, Nevada (tne
"Properties"), described on Exhibit A attacnec hereto and by
this reference made a part hereof, pursuant to tne lease (tne
"Lease") identified on Exhibit A and held by the General Partner.
3.

Location and Principal Place of Business.

of tne partnership m

Utah shall be:

The address

200 American Savings Plaza,

77 West Second South, Salt Lake City, Utan 34101.

The principal

place of tne Partnership operations snail be at tne Properties.
4.

Names and Residences of Members.

of residence of the general partner is:

The name and place

Owanah Oil Corporation,

a Utan corporation, 200 American Savings Plaza, 77 West Second
Scutn, Salt Lake City, Utah 34101.

The names of the limited

partners are as follows:
Maie
Jcr.n D. Archer ("Arcner")

Elliott Wolfe ("Wolfe")

Address
Post Office Box 8 031
Foothill Station
Salt Lake City, Utan

84108

250 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utan 34111

5.

Commitment of General Partner's Assets to the Partnersn-p.

The General Partner dedicates anc commits the Lease to the
Partnership during its life, and all revenues derived from
operat-cns on the Property unaer tne Lease snail constitute

Appellants f
Brief
Appendix 1
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Partnership revenues and be subject to distribution as herein
provided.
6.

Term of the'- Partnership.

The Partnership will exist

for a period of three years from the effective date hereof.
7.

Initial Contributions of Limited Partners.

The limited

partners have contributed, as of the effective date hereof, the
sum» of $5 0,000.00 in cash, said sum having been contributed by
John D. Archer under arrangement between the limited partners
for timing their contributions in accordance with their abilities
to liquidate assets and free cash.
8.

Additional Contributions Agreed to be Made by Limited

Partners.

The limited partners shall contribute, in addition to

the initial contribution set forth in the-.next preceding paragraph,
as follows:

$50,000.00 by Archer on or before December 1, 1981;

$50,000.00 by Wolfe on or before January 4, 1932; $50,000.00 by
Wolfe on or before February 1, 1982; and $50,000.00 by Wolfe and
Archer collectively on or before March 1, 1932, so that the total
contributions of the limited partners during the life of the
Partnership will be $250,000.00.
9.

Share of Profits to be Received by Limited Partners.

Each limited partner shall receive, as compensation by reason
of his contribution, five percent (5%) of the net profits of
the Partnership during its term.

"Net Profits" means the excess

of revenues from partnership operations on the Properties pursuant to the Lease over the costs of said operations after taxes.
Costs of operations shall include interest and service charges
paid during the life of the Partnership on loans and other
credit arrangements made by the General Partner, at any time
before the Partnership formation and during its life, to carry
on activities directly associated with the acquisition of the
Lease, the development and investigation of the Properties, and
technological research.
10.

Right of Limited Partner to Substitute Assignee.

Any limited partner may substitute an assignee as contributor
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at the general partner's address above set forth, but such
substitution shall not relieve the assigning limited partner
of the obligation to contribute in the event his assignee fails
to do so.
11.

,
Right to Admit Additional Limited Partners.

The

partners may admit additional limited partners if ail agree
in writing upon the terms of such admission.
12.

Other Incidents of the Relationship.
(a)

No Priority as Between Limited Partners.

No

limited partner shall have priority over the other with respect
to return of contributions or compensation by way of income
or otherwise.

No limited partner has the right to demand and

receive property other than cash in return for his contributions.
(b)

Allocations of Expenditures.

Expenditures of the

Partnership shall be allocated for income ta_x purposes under the
provisions of Section 704 of the Internal Revenue Code as follows:
(1) Category One Expenses shall be paid from
the contributions of the limited partners, to the extent
the contribution of the limited partners are adequate to
defray them, and the deduction allocated to the limited
partners solely out of said contributions.

"Category One

Expenses" means all rentals to maintain the Lease after
the date hereof and during the life of the Partnership
and all intangible expenses of ditching and diking on
the Premises.

No part of said contributions shall be

utilized for payment of costs which are required to be
capitalized for federal income tax purposes including
but not limited to the cost of acquiring or leasing material
or equipment used in connection with ditching or diking on
the Premises, or processing salt, or the cost of any real
or personal property which has salvage value.
(2) Category Two Expenses and all Category One
Expenses above the amount of limited partner contributions
shall be paid out of funds contributed by the General
Partner or generated by Partnership operations.

"Category
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Two Expenses" means all expenses other than Category One
Expenses.
(3) The Parr.ersnp snail maintain separate cooks
of account with verifying receipts or other documentation
for Category One Expenses and for each limited partner
showing expenditures made out of his account and the Partnership shall, at quarterly intervals until the contributions
have been exhausted, submit to the limited partners reports
showing use of their contributions.
(c)

Conversion of Net Profits Interest to Royalty Interest.

Upon termination of tne Partnership as herein provided, the net
profits interest of the limited partners snail convert to an
overriding royalty interest to be documented by an assignment
by tne General Partner to each limited partner of a one-naif
of one percent overriding royalty, such percentage to be applied
against the value, before processing, of sodium salts recovered
from the Properties pursuant to the terms of the Lease.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed tn-.s
Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership as of the aay
and year first set forth above.
GENERAL PARTNER
OWANAH OIL CORPORATION

Bvr ' s> s

-^~

\

v -J <+^*>

. ^t/A^'/L
Elliott Wol:e"

210 k.. 327
-

STATE 0 ? UTAH

)
:
/£P^day

-

ss.

^

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On this

5

of

{

U&fbalA-^,

1981, personally

before me William J. Colman, who by me duly sworn did say

appeared
that

he is the President of OWANAH OIL CORPORATION, and tnat the within
and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said

corporation

by authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors, and said
William J. Colman duly acknowledged

to me that said

corporation

executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
/
Residing at Salt LakeJTity, Utah
My Commission Expires:

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss .
COUNTY QT SALT LAKE )
On this

/ j T ^ d a y of

S~
(j^^UJb^

,

1981, personally

appeared

before me JOHN D. ARCHER and ELLIOTT WOLFE, the signers of the
within instrument, who duly acknowledged

to me that they

executed

the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC

J

\

Residing at Salt Laka^CjAy, Utah
j\y

L-uij^u-Lij^.on Expires:

l.Vi J><>
EXHIBIT "A"
To Letter Agreement dared Octooer 15, 1981
by and among Owanah Oil Corporation, John D.
"Archer and Elliott Wolfe
Lease dazed January 1, 1968, from Southern Pacific
Corpanv to Paradox Lnuted, er al

Township 22 North, Range 29 East
Churcnill County, Nevada
Section 9- _A11
Section 17-J" NE 1/4

n

Eirj C? DOCUMENT

COST?ACT FOR THE PURCHASE OE REAL PROPERTY

THIS AGREEMENT, made and e n t e r e d i n t o t h i s

t " • day of

Novexrher, 1 9 8 1 , by and between ROYALTY INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Belli
(an undivided 50% i n t e r e s t )
and JOHN D. ARCHER o r ELI2A3ETH ARCHER f o r t h e m s e l v e s ^ and
(an undivided 50% i n t e r e s t )

W I T N 2 5 -5~E. T E:
^-^'-"
••/ '•'
/
/
J
W"£ER-EAS, S e l l e r w i s h e s t o s e l l and Buyers wish /to buy chs
V
/
'

following described r e a l property in Cache County, CJtirr:

''

3a —d.7
? •
*^u
The- n o r t h e a s t cuarter" or one n c r t h e a s c
c h a r t e r ; the* south, h a i r of t h e n o r t h e a s t q u a r t s r r t h e
s o u t h e a s t c i a r t s r of the n o r t h w e s t q u a r t e r ; the east.
h a i r of the s o u t h e a s t c h a r t e r ; the northwest q u a r t e r of
the s c u t h v e s t . T t a r t s r of S e c t i o n 25; the north h a l f of
the northwest, q u a r t e r ; the southwest q u a r t e r of the
s o u t h e a s t q u a r t e r ' of S e c t i o n 25; the n o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r
of the n o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r ; the n o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r of the
s o u t h e a s t q u a r t e r ; the s c u t h v e s t q u a r t e r of t h e s o u t h e a s t
q u a r t e r ; the south h a i r of the southwest q u a r t e r or
Section 24; the s o u t h e a s t q u a r t e r of the s o u t h e a s t
q u a r t e r ' o f Section 23; in Township 10 North/ Range 3
East, S a l t LaJ<a- 3ase and Meridian; Lots 2, 3 and 4;
the southeast, q u a r t e r oh t h e southwest q u a r t e r ; the
s c u t h v e s t q u a r t e r of the s o u t h e a s t q u a r t e r ; and ther c r t h e a s t q u a r t e r of the s o u t h e a s t q u a r t e r of S e c t i o n IP
Tcvr.ship 10 North., Range 4 Ea3t, S a i t Lax a 3ase and
Meridian, o c n t a i l i n g 330.14 acres,, t o r e or l e s s .

P a r c e i 2:

The west hair" or t h e s o u t h e a s t q u a r t e r and.

Township 10 North, Range 3 E a s t , S a i t Laxe 3ase and
Meridian, c o n t a i n i n g 150 a c r e s , n o t e o r ! a s 3 .
P a r c e l 3: The n o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r ; the s o u t h e a s t q u a r t e r
or tne northwest c u a r t a r ' ; the n o r t n e a s t r u a r t a r of the
southwest q r a r t a r ; * the- northwest q u a r t e r of the scutn—
e a s t q u a r t e r of" S e c t i o n 13, the e a s t hair or the
n o r t h e a s t q r a r t e r ; and the north naif of the s o u t h e a s t
q u a r t e r of Section 30, in Township 10 North, Range 4
E a s t or the S a i t Laxa 3ase and Meridian. Aiso the
Southwest q u a r t e r of S e c t i o n 25, and the Southwest q r a r t e r
or t h e Northwest q u a r t e r of 5<*<z- IS, Township LJ South, }
Range 2 E a s t , S a i t Laxa Base and M e r i o i a r .
-•
"""
P a r o e i 4 : The ^<2St hair' of the n o r t h e a s t c u a r t e r ;
the n o r t h e a s t c u a r t e r o r the rcrtthv^sc c u a r t a r * and th^
s o u t h e a s t q r a r t a r of the southwest c u a r t a r ; of Section
20. Townsmp 10 Ncrt-t,- Ranee 4 E a s t , S a l t Laxa Base
Containing 13 4G.14 a c r e s , t o r e : r l e s s , s u h j e c t
r : c i j t i n g r i r n t s of wav.
waner r i g .it 3 p e r t a i n i n g to
:ertv.
" O

— 1

to
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transaction at this time but to effect it on January 4, 1952.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises znd

the

mutual promises herein set forth, it is agreed by and between
the parties as follows:
1.

The Buyers will pay the Seller $100.00 upon the execution

of this instrument.
r

2.

On January 4, 1982, 3uyers will pay co Seller in cash

the sum of $250,000.00.
3.

On receipt of the $250,000.00 as in the next preceding

paragraph provided, Seller will execute and deliver to Buyers a
deed

by which it conveys the Ranch to 3uyers and warrants that

it has made no transfer of any interest in the Ranch or encumbered
it in any manner except as is reflected by the records of the
Cache County Recorder.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this instrument
the day and year first above written.
SELLER:
ROYALTY INVESTMENT COMPANY

3^
William J. Colman, Presiden:
BUYERS:

/

AlA

Joan D. Archer

Elizabeth Archer

CiP^-4't
Elliott Wolfe, Trustee oi zhe
Elliott Wolfe Trust Number 701

OPTION TO PURCHASE REAL PROPERTY

I

EXHIBIT

!

-ik-

JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH B. ARCHER, for themselves
and for the ELIZABETH DALY ARCHER TRUST, and HUBERT WOLFE,
JUDY W. WOLFE and ELLIOTT WOLFE, Trustees for ELLIOTT WOLFE
TRUST Number 701; "Optionors", of Salt Lake City, Utah, in
consideration of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00)
and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged, hereby grant to WILLIAM J, COLMAN,
"Optionee", of Park City, Utah, an option to purchase the
real property (the "Property") described as follows:
Parcel 1: The northeast quarter of the northeast
quarter; the south half of the northeast quarter; the
southeast quarter of the northwest quarter; the east
half of the southeast quarter; the northwest quarter of
the southwest quarter of Section 26; the north half of
the northwest quarter; the southwest quarter of the
southeast quarter of Section 25; the northeast quarter
of the northeast quarter; the northeast quarter of the
southeast quarter; the southwest quarter of the southeast
quarter; the south half of the southwest quarter of
Section 24; the southeast quarter of the southeast
quarter'of Section 23; in Township 10 North, Range 3
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,- Lots 2, 3 and 4;'
the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter; the
southwest quarter of the southeast quarter; and thenortheast- quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 19,
Township 10 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containing 880.L4 acres, mora or less.
Parcel 2: The west half of the southeast quarter and
tne east half of the southwest quarter of Section 26,
Township 10 North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containing 160 acres, more or less.
Parcel 3: The northeast quarter; the southeast quarter
or tne northwest quarter; the northeast quarter of the
southwest quarter;- the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 19, the east half of the
northeast quarter; and the north half of the southeast
quarter of Section 30, in Township 10 North, Range 4
East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian. Also the
Southwest quarter of Section 25, and the Southwest quarter
of the Northwest quarter of Sec. 26, Township 10 South,
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 4: The West half of the northeast quarter;
tne northeast quarter of the northwest quarter; and the
southeast quarter of the southwest quarter; of Section
30. Township 10 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian.
Containing 1340.14 acres, mora or less, subject to
existing rights of way.
Together with all water rights pertaining to the
above property.

BOOK 3 1 0 PACE 1 5 1
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on the following terms and conditions
1.

This Option must be exercised, if at all, on or before

July 2, 1983.
2.

The price to be paid for the Property if the Option

is exercised shall be Six Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars
($650,000.00) payable in cash at tne time the Option is
exercised.
3.

The Optionee ma/ exercise this Option by delivering

to either of tne Optionors at his address set forth below a
notice in the following language
I hereby exercise the Option granted me
under the terms of the Option instrument
of March 1, 1902.
or language otherwise expressing his intent to exercise accompanied by a cashier's or certiried check in the amount of
$650,000.00.

4.

Immediately upon receipt of the notice ard check in

accordance with the provision-, of the next preceding paragraph,
the Optionors shall execute and deliver to the Optionee a
Quit-Clam Deed conveying the Property to the Optionee.
5.

During the life of tne Option, the Optionors will

transfer no interest in the Property and will in no way encumber
it or voluntarily subject it to any lien and will pay all taxes
and assessments against the Property betore the same become
delinquent.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Optionors have executed this
instrument this

day of March, 1982.

I & <dL~<2~

Johrt D. Archer
P, 0. Box 8031 * ^
.Foothill Station
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108

/Elizabeth B. Archer
Salt Lake City, Utah

Hubert Wolfe
Salt Lake City, Utah

BOOK 3 1 0 PACE 1 5 2
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Judy W. Wolfe
Salt Lake City, Utah

,

/'Orb*//

Elliott Wolfe
250 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss .

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE }
On this Ic*f

day

of .March, 1982, personally appeared

before me JOHN D. ARCHER, ELIZABETH B. ARCHER, HUBERT WOLFE,
JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT WOLFE, the signers of the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed
the same.

u^y¥

<S-' sZ&'S^

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:

-y

600K 3 1 0 PACE 1 5 3

EXHIBIT "B"

The following described real property located and
situated in the County of Cache, State of Utah:
Parcel 1: The northeast quarter of the northeast quarter;
the south half of the northeast quarter, the southeast
quarter of the northwest quarter; the east half of the
southeast quarter, the northwest quarter of the southwest
quarter of Section 26; the north half of the northwest
quarter; the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of
Section 25; the nortneast quarter of the northeast quarter;
the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter; the southwest
quarter of the southeast quarter; the south half of the
southwest quarter of Section 24; the southeast quarter of the
southeast quarter of Section 23; in Towr*snip 10 North, Range
3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; Lots 2, 3 and 4; the
southeast quarter of the southwest quarter; the southwest
quarter of the southeast quarter, and the northeast quarter
of the southeast quarter of Section 19, Township 10 North,
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 880,14
acres, more or less.
Parcel 2: The west half of the southeast quarter and the
east naif of the southwest quarter of Section 26, Township 10
North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing
160 acres, more or less.
Parcel 3: The northeast quarter; the southeast quarter of
the northwest quarter; the northeast quarter of the southwest
quarter; the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of
Section 19, the east half of the northeast quarter; and the
,nor^i tulf, of the ioutheatt quarter of Section 30, in
tovnihip 'lO'North, Range 4 Eatt of the Sett Lake Base and
Meridian.*' Also the Southwett quarter of Section 25, and the
Southwest guarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 26,
Township 10 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
Parcel 4: The West half of the northeast quarter; the
northeast quarter of the northwest quarter; and the southeast
quarter of the southwest quarter; or Section 30, Township 10
North, Range <• cadt, Salt Lake Bsae and Meridian.
Containing 1840.14 acres, more or less, subject to existing
rights of way.
Together with all water rights pertaining to the above
property.

wo* 310 n<xl54

78-25-16. P a r o l evidence of contents of writings — When
admissible.
There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, other than the
writing itself, except in the following cases:
(1) When the original has been lost or destroyed, in which case proof
of the loss or destruction must first be made.
(2) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom
the evidence is offered and he fails to produce it after reasonable notice.
(3) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of
a public officer.
(4) When the original has been recorded, and the record or a certified copy thereof is made evidence by this code or other statute.
(5) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time,
and the evidence sought from them is only the general result of the
whole.
Provided, however, if any business, institution, member of a profession or
calling, or any department or agency of government, in the regular course
of business or activity has kept or recorded any memorandum, writing,
entry, print, representation or combination thereof, of any act, transaction,
occurence or event, and in the regular course of business has caused any or
all of the same to be recorded, copied or reproduced by any photographic,
photostatic, microfilm, micro-card, miniature photographic, or other process which accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for so reproducing the original, the original may be destroyed in the regular course of
business unless its preservation is required by law; and such reproduction,
when satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in evidence as the original
itself in any judicial or administrative proceeding whether the original is in
existence or not, an enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is likewise admissible in evidence if the original reproduction is in existence and
available for inspection under direction of court. The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement or facsimile, does not preclude admission of
the original.
In the cases mentioned in subdivisions (3) and (4), a copy of the original,
or of the record, must be produced; in those mentioned in subdivisions (1)
and (2), either a copy or oral evidence of the contents.

Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements.
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a
party, an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other
part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously with it.

Rule 901. Requirement of Authentication or Identification.
(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or identification
as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation,
the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming
with the requirements of this rule:
(1) Testimony of Witness With Knowledge. Testimony t h a t a matter is
what it is claimed to be.
(2) Nonexpert Opinion on Handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the
genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for
purposes of the litigation.
(3) Comparison by Trier or Expert Witness. Comparison by the trier of
fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated.
(4) Distinctive
Characteristics
and the Like. Appearance, contents,
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in
conjunction with circumstances.
(5) Voice Identification.
Identification of a voice, whether heard
firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording,
by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances
connecting it with the alleged speaker.
(6) Telephone Conversations.
Telephone conservations, by evidence
that a call was made to the number assigned at the time by the telephone
company to a particular person or business, if (A) in the case of a person,
circumstances, including self-identification, show the person answering
to be the one called, or (B) in the case of a business, the call was made to a
place of business and the conversation related to business reasonably
transacted over the telephone.
(7) Public Records or Reports. Evidence t h a t a writing authorized by
law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or
a purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any
form, is from the public office where items of this nature are kept.
(8) Ancient Documenis or Data Compilation. Evidence that a document
or data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as to create no
suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where it. if
authentic, would likely be, and (C) has been in existence 20 years or more
at the time it is offered.
(9) Process or System. Evidence describing a process or system used to
produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an
accurate result.
(10) Methods Provided by Statute or Rule. Any method of authentication or identification provided by court rule or statute of this state.

